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Exercise ALCORA: Expansion and Demise, 1971–4
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses* and Robert McNamara
Exercise ALCORA, launched in 1970, was a military understanding negotiated, in
secret, by Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Between October 1970 and
April 1974 there were regular meetings of the various ALCORA bodies, which
had the effect of bringing closer the staff officers of the three armed forces. The
military ties between the three countries were further deepened through the crea-
tion of permanent ALCORA planning and intelligence organisations, as well as
dedicated military forces. This article examines ALCORA’s trajectory, and the
hopes deposited in it by its promoters, as well as its eventual demise in the wake
of the Portuguese revolution of 1974. It pays close attention to the links between
that trajectory and the changing security situation in southern Africa, notably in
the Tete province of Mozambique, the source of mounting concern within the
ALCORA establishment. The shortcomings of ALCORA are also highlighted,
notably its failure to identify the greatest of all threats: Portugal’s waning commit-
ment to its colonial wars.
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In an earlier article, the origins of Exercise ALCORA were examined.1 ALCORA
was found to be the result of a number of factors: a cold-war climate in which the
West seemed to be on the defensive; the worsening military situation in the
Portuguese colonies; a revision in South African military thinking (notably the devel-
opment, by General Charles Allan Fraser, of a ‘total threat’ scenario2); and internal
rivalries within the South African government. The aim of ALCORA was ambitious
in that it sought to ‘investigate ways and means of achieving a coordinated tripartite
effort between Portugal, Rhodesia and the RSA with a view to countering the mutual
threat against their territories in Southern Africa’.3 The ties that bound the military
staffs of the ALCORA countries - Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa - continued
to strengthen in the years that followed, despite a number of issues, some of them
serious, which remained contentious among their respective governments, and even
among the wider armed forces. The objective of this article is to illustrate that
strengthening, best exemplified by the creation of the Permanent ALCORA Planning
Organization (PAPO), before moving on to examine ALCORA’s demise in the wake
of the Portuguese revolution of April 1974 - an event which, despite its enormous
implications for Southern Africa - caught ALCORA operatives unawares.4 That the
Portuguese revolution came as a surprise to decision-makers in Rhodesia and South
Africa was, however, indicative of ALCORA’s failings, and these too will be
explored in this article.
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The international context
During Exercise ALCORA’s four-year lifespan, the international fortunes of the
white-ruled states, closely linked to the cold war, ebbed and flowed.5 On the one
hand, the US and UK electorates tacked to the right, electing Richard Nixon and
Edward Heath. Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, were
convinced that Africa’s white-ruled states were likely to continue for the foreseeable
future. Irritated by the anti-American attitude of black-run African countries, the
Nixon administration, late in 1969, tilted marginally towards the ‘white redoubt’
with the implementation of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 of
late 1969, as was noticed by a South African observer.6 Edward Heath’s Conserva-
tive Party government, meanwhile, lifted the arms embargo on South Africa7,
showed considerably more understanding for Portugal8 and signed an agreement
with Ian Smith’s rebel government in Rhodesia in November 1971, although the deal
eventually failed when the Pearce Commission reported its overwhelming unaccept-
ability to the African population.9 Portugal seemed on the verge of receiving much
more sympathetic treatment from the United States after it facilitated the US resup-
ply of Israel during the 1973 Middle Eastern War.10 South Africa was actively pursu-
ing a South Atlantic Pact involving like-minded Latin American countries, an idea
making headway in 1969.11 The closing of the Suez Canal after the 1967 Middle East
War and the growth of the Soviet Union’s naval power increased the strategic impor-
tance of the Southern Africa for the West.12 From 1967, South Africa had also
attempted to improve its relations with some of the African states. This outward pol-
icy was motivated by both what Pretoria believed to be common sense and the belief
that regional bridge-building would enhance relations with the West.13 However,
with notable exceptions in Francophone Africa and Malawi, the policy garnered lit-
tle results. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union and China were stepping up their sup-
port for frontline states and liberation movements alike.14 The Soviet interest in
Southern Africa, although modest in ambition15, was motivated by the opportunities
provided by the perceived western tilt towards the white-run states and the need to
block the Chinese, who were now bitter opponents.16 Sophisticated surface-to-air
missiles were supplied to rebels in Guinea-Bissau in 1973 by the Soviets at Cuba’s
request.17 This greatly weakened the Portuguese position there and no doubt these
game-changing weapons would have flowed to Angola and Mozambique, if not for
the April 1974 coup in Lisbon. The flow of ever more sophisticated weapons was a
major problem for the white-run states: from 1964–75 only France was still supplying
South Africa with sophisticated weaponry.18 The gravest foreign threat to these
embattled countries was considered to be China, particularly through the financing
and building of the Tanzania–Zambia (TANZAM) railway, which threatened to
break the white economic stranglehold over Zambia. On the battlefield, though, mat-
ters were ambiguous. A perilous situation in Angola at the end of the 1960s seemed
to have been turned in Portugal’s favour by the early 1970s.19 However, despite a
stepped-up rhythm of Portuguese military operations, FRELIMO’s insurgency
became increasingly threatening in Mozambique. Its undoubted ability to hold terri-
tory in the Tete district threatened the showpiece hydroelectric project at Cahora
Bassa, allowed for attacks into neighbouring districts, and had led, by 1972, to the
revival of guerrilla activity by Zimbabwean liberation groups, who now had safer
passage into their operational zone. It was this international context of mounting
threat drove the ALCORA project.
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The consolidation of ALCORA
By the end of 1970 the basic architecture of ALCORA had been sketched. At the
highest level stood the ALCORA Top-Level Committee (ATLC), which was to meet
eight times over four years20; below it stood the ALCORA Coordinating Committee
(ACOC), which oversaw the workings of subcommittees dealing with priority issues.
These included intelligence, forward planning, logistics, transportation, and telecom-
munications. Meetings of its central bodies - the Top-Level Committee and the
Coordinating Committee - began to occur regularly in 1971, as did those of the
lower-level subcommittees.21 There was a lot to get through; the fear of a conven-
tional war in Southern Africa in the mid to long term led to a number of working
papers which had to be constantly reviewed and revised, covering, for example, the
means of securing safe communications and telecommunications, an estimate of the
potential enemy’s military strength, its vulnerable points (for aerial attack), and its
dealings with the super-powers, as well as China, whose interest in Africa was becom-
ing evident at this stage.22 The first meeting of the Coordinating Committee was held
in Lisbon, in May 1971. Detailed instructions were prepared for all the subcommit-
tees; thus, for example, Intelligence, singled out as the most important subcommittee,
was told to ‘study the documents produced by the Portuguese and South African–
Rhodesia Delegations in order that eventually a comprehensive jointly agreed paper
on the threat may be produced.’ From its first meeting there should emerge a
‘preliminary document outlining the threat to Southern Africa’, no longer than six
pages. Such a document would then be updated at each meeting of the subcommittee,
‘or when new intelligence dictates the revision or updating of the document as neces-
sary’. The subcommittee should also ‘establish the most appropriate channels to
exchange intelligence, that is, any information of interest to other countries must be
passed’ and then, ‘by whatever means necessary’, it should be confirmed.23
ALCORA’s foundation documents followed quickly. In 1972 the Psychological
Action Subcommittee prepared PASC/11, detailing the ‘psychological threat’ to the
ALCORA territories.24 In all-encompassing terms it noted: ‘Adverse actions are
designed to influence opinions, feelings, creeds, and, thus, the attitude and behaviour
of friends, enemies or neutrals, in order to ensure or facilitate the securing of their
interests in the ALCORA territories, and undermining those of the legally consti-
tuted governments.’25 That same year the Command and Control Subcommittee
(CCSC) produced document CCSC/9, outlining ALCORA’s inter-armed forces co-
operation systems. This document specified three types of international co-operation:
Coordinated, Support, and Combined Operations. It further stated that in order for
any of these operations to be carried out, inter-governmental approval was neces-
sary.26 The Counter-Insurgency Subcommittee set to work devising a common doc-
trine, which might be inscribed in a single paperback volume, to be carried by
officers in the field. So much paperwork was being generated, in fact, that secrecy
became a paramount concern. At the third ACOC meeting, in Salisbury in April
1972, it was suggested that each country establish a secure library, where copies of all
ALCORA documents be housed, reducing the security risk attached to delegates
travelling with the required copies of Top Secret documents.27 Meanwhile, the aerial
mapping of the Tete district in Mozambique (Operation Junction), seen as a priority
action, began under ALCORA auspices.
Experience showed which Subcommittees were worthwhile and which ones could
be sacrificed. One early victim was the Medical Subcommittee, whose death sentence
The International History Review 91
was passed by the 3rd ATLC meeting. Reorganisation also occurred at the level of the
subcommittees devoted to aerial matters; three - the Aerial Planning, Air Defence,
and Airfield Subcommittees - devolved into a single entity (still called Aerial
Planning Subcommittee). This subcommittee complained that it lacked both intelli-
gence on the aerial threat to the ALCORA territories - which had yet to be provided
by the ISC - and a general strategy, which only governments could provide.28 This
was a fundamental question, and one which the Portuguese delegation, led by
Brigadier M. D. Neto, wanted to see noted in the minutes. The Portuguese then went
on to state four measures that could not be excluded from the ‘strategic concept of
the use of ALCORA forces’:
(a) Systematic weakening of the Enemy elements participating in the revolution-
ary war, with special incidence over the guerrilla elements.
(b) Existence of an aerial dissuasion force, capable of preventive and retaliatory
action.
(c) Existence of airborne means of intervention capable of operating, at a
moment’s notice, wherever their presence may be demanded;
(d) Active and passive defence of the vital points of our military and economic
structure.
This was an early assertion of the need for a joint airborne intervention force, a con-
cept whose importance would grow in time. Significantly, it was put forth not by the
Portuguese Army, but by the Air Force; the two corporations’ attitude to the conflict
differed, and this rift would continue to grow until 1974.29
Intelligence successes and failures: the case of PAIO
The first move from ad hoc arrangement to more permanent liaison structures came
in the field of Military Intelligence, through the setting up of the Permanent
ALCORA Intelligence Organization (PAIO), argued for by the Intelligence
Subcommittee (ISC) from its very first meeting in June 1971. At the second meet-
ing, in September of that same year, the subcommittee ‘elaborated a detailed study
into the creation of a Permanent Secretariat’: a recommendation that was accepted
by the Coordinating Committee, which passed it on to the ATLC along with the
suggestion for disbandment of the Intelligence Subcommittee. The ATLC, meeting
in December 1971, accepted in principle the creation of a Permanent Commission,
but decided to refer the matter of the Subcommittee to the three national govern-
ments. The Subcommittee stuck to its guns and at its third meeting, in January
1972, recommended its own survival and insisted that the new body should be
called a Permanent Secretariat, and not a Commission, whose work would aid the
Subcommittee. Three months later, ACOC defended the use of the term Commis-
sion.30 Meeting in July, the Subcommittee reaffirmed its point of view that an
Intelligence Subcommittee was needed, supported by ‘a permanent body which
continuously centralizes all of the complex and vast tasks of amassing and process-
ing intelligence’. This was upheld by the 3rd ATLC meeting. Rhodesia would house
the new body although PAIO ‘should eventually be located within the combined
ALCORA headquarters, when this is established’.31 When created, PAIO ensured
that the professionalism of ISC reports increased, as did the quality of the commen-
tary on the raw intelligence.32
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The document on threat assessment proved problematic, especially in relation to
Mozambique. An early draft, ISC/2, was found wanting at the third meeting of
ATLC. The Rhodesian delegation thought it unduly optimistic, and forced changes
to the proposed wording, which henceforth warned of ‘serious consequences should
the situation in Tete not be reversed’. Nevertheless, the Intelligence Subcommittee
stuck to its guns, producing ISC/3 the following month. This was seven pages long,
and attempted to summarise the dangers facing ALCORA at short (until the end of
the year) and medium (until the end of 1976) terms. The USSR was identified as the
main menace. Moscow’s threat was three-pronged. It secured aid to African states in
order to increase its influence; it provided direct help to the ‘terrorist organizations’
and moral support for them at world gatherings; and it extended naval operations to
encompass the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. A second danger was Communist
China, now a member of the United Nations; it too supported the ‘terrorist organ-
izations’ and the OAU, especially when it came to a ‘Joint African Force’. Beijing
was determined to raise the issue of Namibia at the United Nations, to exploit the
Tanzania-Zambia (TANZAM) railway to extend its influence over the countries
involved, as well as Botswana, and to encourage ‘terrorist offensives’ in Angola and
Rhodesia. The United Nations, ‘subject to the influence of the communist and
Afro-Asian majority’, was another source of hostility to ALCORA, as was the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), which could be expected to develop a com-
mon military force, something that, because of its ‘inherent difficulties’, would not
be ready until the end of 1976. In the meantime, it would strengthen the hand of the
‘terrorist groups’, while frontline states such as Zambia and Tanzania increased their
military capability. It is certainly true to say that Chinese policy hardened after 1971
in support of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), especially after
Samora Machel’s visit to Beijing.33 In Malawi, Dr Banda’s hand was weaker than
before, it being possible that its support would vanish before the end of 1976. Finally,
ISC/3 analysed the ‘terrorist’ threat. In Rhodesia the development of urban terror-
ism, aimed at the white population, was viewed as a possibility; some ‘subversion
and violence’ was admitted in South Africa, alongside South-West Africa People’s
Organisation (SWAPO) incursions and mine-laying expeditions in South-West
Africa. In Angola the expectation was that the situation would improve, while in
Mozambique, finally, the situation was described as being under control, notably in
Tete, and so ‘it can be concluded that a deterioration of the situation is not foresee-
able, unless FRELIMO receives considerable reinforcements.’34 This assessment flew
in the face of reality, and, as will be shown, since Tete was emerging as the key battle-
front in Southern Africa.
In December 1972 the Portuguese Minister of Defence approved the ALCORA
Countries Military Strategic Concept.35 This was defined as a ‘global strategic
concept’ for Southern Africa - defined as the ALCORA territories, Botswana,
Swaziland, Lesotho, and Malawi. ‘Southern Africa’ was, according to the document,
a political, not a geographic, term; it therefore excluded the countries defined as
‘neighbours’: Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Congo, and Madagascar. The document
pointed out that within the wider setting of the cold war, dominated by the threat of
nuclear confrontation among the superpowers, ‘international disagreements will
probably be resolved through successive limited conflicts.’ Southern Africa, aban-
doned by the West, and coveted by the Soviet bloc for its strategic and material
importance, was a key battleground. The document argued that ‘a joint plan against
Southern Africa, to which Russia and China are committed, is already being
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executed.’ It was a long-term venture, including important infrastructural commit-
ments that might with time be used to underpin a conventional conflict. The
ALCORA countries were not self-sufficient; they were dependent on raw materials
(including oil), finished goods (including military equipment), and, ‘especially as far
as Angola and Mozambique are concerned, the additional human potential and fur-
ther resources sent by the Portuguese metropole’. This meant that external lines of
communication had to be kept open for Southern Africa to survive. Against such a
threat, military preparation, as well as internal security, had to be stepped up:
‘However, the ALCORA strategic concept for action will be meaningful only if it
generates tripartite reaction to any aspect of the global threat, from the subversive -
already under way against each and every ALCORA territory - to a threat that might
have conventional characteristics.’ The document was confident that in the medium
term (end of 1976), the ALCORA countries could handle threats even if China
increased aid for an ‘African Intervention Force’. The long-term forecast generated
some concern: the situation might worsen to such an extent that the United Nations,
dominated by unfriendly countries, would intervene in order to put an end to a dis-
pute allegedly capable of endangering world peace. This is because African states,
with Soviet or Chinese aid, might well have acquired the military technology required
to cut ALCORA off from the rest of the world. The document concluded by setting
out the six military objectives for ALCORA: eliminate subversive activity (by using
‘military means to destroy terrorism wherever it exists and prevent its establishment
in non-affected areas’); organise a strategic force, made up of mobile land forces and
air power, to dissuade aggression and ‘ensure a timely and efficient intervention’;
develop an ‘intense socio-psychological campaign’ designed to win over the popula-
tion of the ALCORA countries; develop an external psychological campaign, to
demonstrate the importance of the struggle against the Communist bloc in the region
to ALCORA’s neighbours and the ‘free world’; develop a better intelligence network,
especially in the neighbouring countries, capable not only of detecting threats but
also carrying out ‘special operations’; and, finally, guarantee maritime communica-
tions, notably the Cape Route.
The publication of this document was welcomed by the ISC36, which expressed its
complete agreement with the Strategic Military Concept as outlined. It added, how-
ever, that the ALCORA intelligence machinery was not in a position to establish the
required network of agents, something that could only be done by the national intel-
ligence services, not under ALCORA control.37 Intelligence services were not
immune to rivalries and jealousies; the rift in South Africa between BOSS and
Military Intelligence was notorious, and might well have played a part in the ISC’s
difficulties. The ALCORA Strategic Concept was also examined by the APSC38,
which stated that the main strategic task - ‘the elimination of terrorism’ - would be
hard to accomplish without each country having the required number and type of
counter-insurgency planes, as outlined in earlier documents. Of great importance in
the preparation for future conflict had been the holding of a paper exercise in the sec-
ond half of 1972, long called-for, to test the effectiveness of the ALCORA structures
as they had developed.39
A combined headquarters
At the 3rd ATLC meeting, in June 1972, it was agreed that a combined ALCORA
headquarters was desirable, since it ‘would lead to greater efficiencies in the studies
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and labours at military level, while making it easier for the three Governments to
raise ALCORA to a higher status’. The Command and Control Subcommittee
(CCSC) drew up proposals, and subsequently the 4th ACOC meeting agreed that
ALCORA objectives could not be met without a permanent HQ with a planning
staff attached, and perhaps permanent ‘psychological action’ staff as well. The
4th ATLC agreed, subject to political approval. The 4th ACOC and ATLC meetings
considered a document entitled ‘The Future of Exercise ALCORA’. The most likely
threat to ALCORA was still seen as a conventional attack (by the OAU) as a
humanitarian response to domestic disturbances in the white redoubt. Worryingly
ALCORA, as it stood, would not be able to respond in time. Planning and opera-
tions had to be made more dynamic through a permanent HQ as large-scale joint
operations had to be envisaged in a time of crisis. The 5th ACOC meeting, in Lisbon,
May 1973, examined the latest CCSC proposal for a Combined ALCORA
Permanent Staff (CAPS), concluding that this should be instituted immediately as
the nucleus of a future ALCORA Headquarters. The ATLC agreed that the
ALCORA strategic concept could not work without a permanent body.40 This
CAPS proposal formed the basis of a more ambitious creation when, at the 5th meet-
ing of the ATLC, the presiding officer, General van der Riet (SADF), reported that
the South African and Portuguese Defence Ministers had agreed a Permanent
ALCORA Planning Organization (PAPO), with Pretoria offering to house the new
body and to furnish it with administrative services.41 PAPO’s mission was ‘to plan,
coordinate and implement ALCORA issues as determined by ATLC and ACOC’.42
Its duties were to accelerate the planning, co-ordination, and implementation of
ALCORA matters, elaborate ALCORA doctrine and a policy of uniformity, co-
ordinate and formulate contingency plans, take over the responsibilities of the sub-
committees, and constitute a headquarters should combined operations be required.
Alongside PAPO, it was considered that a hitherto dormant element within
ALCORA, its Permanent Consultative Committee (PCC), would be activated, begin-
ning in September 1973 in Lourenc¸o Marques. The significance of the PCC was that
it brought together the operations commanders of the three countries. One meeting
eventually took place, but the 6th ATLC meeting, in November 1973, suspended the
PCC and decided that thenceforth the Portuguese ATLC delegation should include
the Commanders-in-Chief for Angola and Mozambique. It was also agreed that
ALCORA operational commanders should be able to meet whenever their mutual
interest demanded it, but that a PAPO element should be present. All of this, of
course, suggests some tension between staff officers and their counterparts in the
field. On 12 September 1973, the ALCORA Defence Ministers met to approve the
creation of PAPO.43
In October 1973, ACOC met in Salisbury. SADFMajor General Clifton, PAPO’s
Director General, predicted that PAPO’s Pretoria HQ would be ready in
mid-November.44 By the end of the following month, at the 6th ATLC meeting also
in Salisbury, Clifton stated that Rhodesian and South African officers to be seconded
to PAPO had all been named, but only two Portuguese. The PAPO premises were to
be ready by the end of the month, while a document entitled ‘Mission, Organization
and PAPO functions’ had been produced and was at the disposal of the ATLC
for approval. PAPO, Clifton added, would be ready to begin its regular work on
7 January, and it was to be hoped that the full complement of Portuguese personnel
would be appointed at the start of 1974. One of PAPO’s drawback was that secrecy
became harder and harder to ensure; the pressure for public disclosure of ALCORA
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mounted at this time but was resisted by Portugal, afraid of being portrayed interna-
tionally as unable to preserve order in its ‘overseas provinces’.
The war in Tete
The evolution in Exercise ALCORA must be set against the background of
the evolving military situation in the Portuguese colonies. The north-western
Mozambican province of Tete was a major preoccupation. Hitherto neglected from
a developmental point of view, it was now the setting for the most grandiose
Portuguese building project in Africa, the giant Cahora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi
River. Cahora Bassa was set to transform the landscape, through the creation of an
enormous lake, and generate more power than Mozambique could hope to consume.
It was funded in part by South African investors, and its electricity had to be
exported across the whole region in order for it to be financially viable. Road and
rail links were improved in order to allow for the construction to go ahead, and a vir-
tual city established for the international workforce, whose protection was a para-
mount concern for the Portuguese. A vast but vulnerable network of pylons and
electrical cables had to be put in place to allow for the distribution of the power gen-
erated. It was hoped that the dam would begin operations at the end of 1974.
Just as 1970 had been the key year in the development of Exercise ALCORA,
so too had it been the key year for the war in Mozambique. A new Portuguese
military commander, General Kaulza de Arriaga, took over the defence of the
province. A Salazar loyalist, Kaulza saw the war as part of a Sino-Soviet expan-
sionist drive and believed in a successful military outcome.45 The overly optimistic
Kaulza was determined to take the war to FRELIMO on its chosen territory in
the north-east district of Cabo Delgado. The largest Portuguese military opera-
tion of the colonial wars, codenamed No Gordio (Gordian Knot) was unleashed
in July, involving as many as 8,000 Portuguese and locally raised forces, the
Grupos Especiais. FRELIMO survived the offensive, its forces retreating north-
wards to safety in Tanzania. It also expanded its area of operations, despatching
guerrillas to both the neighbouring Niassa district and the strategically vital Tete
district, where the war would be won and lost. Confronted with a war on a larger
scale, the Portuguese reacted by drafting an ever larger number of Africans into
their army, while rounding up more and more of the population into protected
villages, or aldeamentos. By 1971, Tete had become not only FRELIMO’s princi-
pal front, a highway into other districts of Mozambique, but also of crucial
importance for Zimbabwean nationalist organisations which used it as a point of
entry into Rhodesia. Tete was, in this respect, far safer than the Zambia-Rhodesia
border, along which Salisbury’s forces were backed by a heavily armed South
African police detachment.46
At the end of 1971, the Odell committee, limited to South African and Rhodesian
defence officials, was established to review the deterioriating situation in the Tete
district.47 The tone and language of its report reflected a growing disquiet about
Portuguese tactics, the threat from the guerrila movements and the growing threat
of Communist China. The committee members wanted to bring to the notice of
their governments, as a matter of urgency, the imminent danger to the security of
Southern Africa. Such was the deterioration of the Portuguese position in Tete that
the Odell Committee argued that military liaison was not enough: the ‘potential
danger’ required bilateral meetings between Smith and Vorster, ‘as a prelude to a
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meeting attended by them and the Prime Minister of Portugal’.48 It is remarkable
that such discussions were occurring outside the existing ALCORA structures.
Given their doubts about the efficiency of the Portuguese Army, Rhodesia and
South Africa identified the ability to operate freely in Mozambique as a priority.
Licence was initially given by the Portuguese to Rhodesian forces entering Tete, in
hot pursuit or for lengthier stays, but this was later revoked after Spanish missionary
priests denounced the human effects of this intervention, notably the Mucumbura
massacre.49 The issue generated severe tension between Rhodesians and Portuguese,
evident at a meeting with the Rhodesian military leadership hosted by General
Kaulza de Arriaga and his staff at Kaulza’s Nampula headquarters on 4 August
1972. The Rhodesians, headed by Air Marshal A. O. G. Wilson, spoke of a ‘marked
deterioration of the security situation outside Rhodesia’s borders’, whose impact
would soon be felt in Rhodesia itself. Rhodesian intelligence indicated that
three enemy organisations, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Front for the Liberation of
Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), were present in Tete:
Rhodesian Forces would like to be able to take pre-emptive action against Rhodesian
terrorist presence in the Tete District thus losing no opportunity to forestall their plans.
However, this was not possible as General de Arriaga had recently withdrawn the Trans-
border Operations Agreement which permitted the Rhodesian forces to attack elements
of ZAPU and ZANU in the Tete district.
Making possible this expansion of anti-Rhodesian activity was the ‘Portuguese
troop shortage’. The desired aim of the Rhodesian delegation was to obtain carte
blanche ‘to react immediately as opportunity presented itself’.50 Kaulza de Arriaga
was not keen on the idea: he argued that the Cahora Bassa reservoir, once filled,
would restrict access to Rhodesia from the Tete district; that the Portuguese were
increasing their troop levels in the area, and improving communications; and that
previous Rhodesian actions had led to the killing of civilians, and had been exploited
by the common enemies of the two countries. The Spanish missionaries who had
denounced the Mucumbura killings were now awaiting trial in Lourenc¸o Marques;
further Rhodesian actions before or during the trial would be exploited by the
priests’ defence: ‘As the C in C he would have liked Rhodesia to help but he was sub-
jected to enormous political pressures.’51
The continued level of concern was demonstrated in a letter from Ian Smith to his
Portuguese counterpart, Marcello Caetano, on 21 August, to be delivered personally
by Central Intelligence Organization director Ken Flower.52 Smith wrote:
The activities of FRELIMO have been steadily increasing in the areas immediately adja-
cent to our common border and it is known that members of Rhodesian African terror-
ist groups operating from Zambia are taking advantage of this situation. They now find
it easier to infiltrate into Rhodesia from Mocambique [sic] than directly across the
Zambia-Rhodesia border.
The fact that FRELIMO had recently advanced into the Vila Pery area, to the
south of Tete, only added to the sense of urgency. Smith also expressed his
disappointment over the fact that General Sa Viana Rebelo, the Portuguese
Minister of Defence, had met P. W. Botha (see below) while in Mozambique but
not his Rhodesian counterpart, Jack Howman: ‘In Southern Africa the interests of
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our three countries are indivisible and I believe that we should all ensure that we
lose no opportunity of furthering our mutual cooperation.’ Still, Smith offered to
visit Caetano in Lisbon; it had, after all, been eight years since he had met Salazar,
and ‘so much has happened since then that there would be every justification for
the two of us to meet as soon as it could conveniently be arranged.’53 Smith did
indeed visit Portugal early in October 1972, his presence in Lisbon being explained
as a necessary component of a holiday, which included a stay in Madeira.54 All of
this raises the possibility that all this Rhodesian pressure for more aggressive action
(and the right to act independently in Mozambique) was a catalyst in the Wiriyamu
Massacre in Tete in December 1972 by Portuguese troops. This foreign pressure
might be usefully added to Reis and Oliveira’s conclusion that the massacre
stemmed from a successful provocation strategy by FRELIMO insurgents, increas-
ingly aggressive Portuguese resettlement, a failure of intelligence and, lastly,
Arriaga’s new operational approach, which ‘emphasized more kinetic search and
destroy airborne operations and/or a discriminate killing of populations seen as
irretrievably on the side of the insurgents’.55
The political damage to the Portuguese cause from too close a contact with the
Rhodesian and South African regimes was enormous, since they embodied an abso-
lute contradiction of Portugal’s avowed desire to construct a multi-racial society.56
Still, pressure for a restoration of Rhodesia’s right to intervene in Tete was immense,
and eventually paid off - but only because the Portuguese found themselves unable
to halt the insurrection in the district. After the vital Zambezi River line had been
breached, all that the Portuguese could hope for was that FRELIMO’s actions
would be easier to control once the Cahora Bassa lake had begun to fill up. Early in
1974 the white population of two distant cities, Vila Pery and the key port of Beira,
increasingly threatened by Tete-based FRELIMO units, erupted in protest against
the army’s inability to control the situation.57 Similar protests occurred in Nampula,
this time aimed at Catholic priests, after the local bishop had defended
Mozambique’s independence, based on the Church’s adhesion to the principle of
self-determination, in a pastoral letter on 10 June.58 Tete increasingly preoccupied
influential Rhodesians and Portuguese, with the idea being mooted that ‘the only
solution was that of establishing a joint command’: a Portuguese/Rhodesian partner-
ship, with South Africa providing material and financial aid.59 As an expression of
this mounting concern over Tete, Ken Flower visited Portugal some two weeks
before the April revolution to meet with the Defence Minister. Rhodesia, the Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO) director pointed out, had been considering the possi-
bility of sealing off the Mozambican border, an immense undertaking; it would be
easier, it had been concluded, to establish a line in Mozambique - such as the
Zambezi River, from Zumbo, through the Cabora-Bassa lake, until the Indian
Ocean - wherein all three countries could concentrate their military efforts. Simulta-
neously, they should sponsor the continued development in Mozambique of the
Flechas, the fearsome force developed in Angola by the Polıcia Internacional e de
Defesa do Estado/Direcc¸~ao-Geral de Seguranc¸a (PIDE/DGS), Portugal’s secret
police, initially composed of Bushmen and later expanded to include captured
nationalists.60
Fighting in the district can be seen as the catalyst for change within
ALCORA, transforming it from an agency designed to deal with a medium-term
conventional threat to one whose remit included the war actually being waged.
The 6th ATLC meeting directed the nascent PAPO organisation to produce a
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document on ‘The Elimination of Terrorism in Southern Africa’. Given the ever-
worsening situation in Tete, this was not surprising. Reporting to the ATLC in
June 1974, South African Defence Force (SADF) Major General Clifton, still in
charge of PAPO, pointed out that he and his staff had started from scratch on
this task: ‘Our interpretation of your directive was that you required us to recom-
mend a realistic strategy and practical plans to defeat terrorism. Consequently,
the theme of this study as it developed, was the need for combined offensive
action to gain the initiative.’ Envisaged outcomes included operations in the
Zambezi Valley and simultaneous attacks on terrorist bases in neighbouring
countries. While this document was being elaborated, the old Sub-Committees
briefed PAPO on their business before disbanding; eleven such sessions were held
in the first months of 1974.61
A permanent ALCORA military force
‘The Future of Exercise ALCORA’ mentioned, as alluded to above, the need for
closer integration of the ALCORA armed forces in order to undertake large-scale
combined operations. These would best be handled by an ALCORA Strategic Force
(ASF), a mobile military reserve, part of it airborne, which could be deployed at short
notice to a given trouble spot. The matter was discussed at length at the 5th ATLC
meeting, which recommended the creation of a working group to assess the matter
and draft terms of reference for the CCSC. In these terms of reference, the working
group urgently sought a study by the CCSC and the rapid creation of the force, which
could be employed either against ‘terrorism’, whose elimination was confirmed as pri-
ority, or a conventional threat, should it arise. An initial estimate put this at a battal-
ion, with air support, to be in place by the end of 1974, and an airborne brigade, with
the required air support, to be ready by mid to late 1975; this was an open-ended
military commitment, whose strength might continue to grow in accordance with
evolving needs. The proposed force contained a significant paradox: it could only
serve to dissuade if it was made public, but the political will to ‘go public’ on the
reserve, and the ALCORA mechanisms behind it was not, as we have seen, present in
Portugal. The 6th ATLC meeting saw Rhodesia make the strongest yet link between
ALCORA and the on-going war against ‘terrorism’, which had to be defeated and
not just contained: as a result, PAPO was instructed to review the work already car-
ried out and to ‘elaborate an appraisal of the situation, recommending plans for the
best way of eliminating, immediately, terrorism from Southern Africa’.62 Not every-
one in the Portuguese armed forces agreed with its creation, since not everyone
believed that a military victory was possible. General Francisco Costa Gomes, by
late 1973, was falling into this category. In an opinion written that month, Costa
Gomes, at that time Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, took the view that this per-
manent force, as proposed by ALCORA, would damage the operational capabilities
of the badly stretched Portuguese defences.63 Costa Gomes played for time, arguing
that it would be prudent to establish ‘a certain number of principles and rules which
the ASF should obey in the organisation, equipment and training of its units’. Costa
Gomes ruled out completely the contribution, by Portugal, of helicopters to the
force’s aerial component, and stressed the need for an ALCORA aerial retaliation
force, as well as a surface-to-air capability, areas in which South Africa could be
expected to take the lead.
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ALCORA’s shortcomings
We have already considered the workings of the Odell Committee, which met behind
the backs of the Portuguese. Significantly, the Portuguese and South Africans also kept
matters beyond the knowledge of the Rhodesians. In July 1972, the two countries’
Defence Ministers met in Lourenc¸o Marques. A variety of issues was naturally dis-
cussed. The final substantive issue was the ‘inclusion of Rhodesia in the present meet-
ing’s affairs’. P. W. Botha stressed Rhodesia’s importance to the defence of Southern
Africa, and pointed out that collaboration with Salisbury should be wider than just
ALCORA-related questions. Sa Viana Rebelo, while agreeing with Rhodesia’s impor-
tance, replied that there was no need to inform Salisbury of the creation of a secure
communications link between Pretoria and Nampula ‘given the secret nature of the
matters to be handled’. And when Botha asked if he could inform the Rhodesians of
the discussions surrounding the Tete district, which concerned them directly, General
Kaulza de Arriaga, also present, complained of the brutality of the Rhodesians when
allowed to operate in Portuguese territory. He added that in future, ‘operations on
national soil will always be carried out by our troops, who will force the enemy to move
into Rhodesia, where that country’s forces can then eliminate it.’64
ALCORA was never able to smooth out the relationship between Portuguese and
Rhodesian armed forces, nor to overturn the situation in the Tete district, which contin-
ued to worsen despite Kaulza de Arriaga’s assurances, and which became the main
threat to Rhodesia’s security, notably after the closure of the border with Zambia in
January 1973. The US Consul in Lourenc¸o Marques was well aware of these tensions
between the Portuguese, who ‘generally believe they know great deal more about coun-
terinsurgency’ than the Rhodesians and the South Africans, and the latter two groups,
who frequently made ‘thinly veiled suggestions they could run Mozambique war better
than “slack”, “inefficient” Portuguese’.65 At a regular tripartite meeting of the intelli-
gence services, held in Lisbon in September 1973 outside the scope of ALCORA opera-
tions, with General Van Den Bergh of BOSS, Ken Flower of the CIO, and Major Silva
Pais of the PIDE/DGS present, it was concluded that ‘the situation in Mozambique is
such as to cause deep worry to the South African and Rhodesian governments. It has
been suggested that there is a need to re-examine the concept of joint operations, partic-
ularly in the common border areas, especially as far as the Tete district is concerned.’66
It was also agreed that the Flechas experiment had to be extended - in other words, that
the PIDE/DGS should take over more of the fighting, at the expense of an army which
was increasingly distrusted by its supposed allies. The report on the situation in
Mozambique, presented by the Portuguese secret police, was indeed worrying; in the
Tete district FRELIMO now felt sufficiently confident to attack in large units of 100–
200 guerrillas, as well as to employ heavy weapons, such as the 122 mm rockets, south
of the Zambezi River. An urban guerrilla campaign in Tete town itself could not be
ruled out. Worse still, FRELIMO had met with little resistance as it moved south into
Vila Pery district; in one year, its fighters had moved 200 km into Portuguese territory
with no strain on their supply chain - this while making inroads into the Beira district
as well, with considerable impact on the morale of the civilian population, white and
black. Two months later, at the 6th ATLC meeting in Salisbury, the delegates listened
to a report by a Lieutenant Colonel Parker of the Rhodesian Army regarding his
corporation’s on-going operations. The presiding officer, Lieutenant General G.P.
Walls, explained ‘that the Rhodesians’ operations in Mozambique were being carried
out with the complete approval of General Basto Machado (the Portuguese
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Commander-in-Chief) and that the co-operation between the two countries was very
good’.67 That these operations, not specified in the minutes, had not resolved the prob-
lem was evident from the rest of the meeting; discussing the possibility of an ‘Anti-
Terrorist Reserve Force’ (ATRF), the Rhodesians argued that terrorism was being con-
tained, not eliminated, and that the time had come to co-ordinate efforts in order to
eliminate terrorism in southern Africa: a stance which led the ATLC to charge PAPO
with drawing up plans for precisely such an action.
Another dispute between Portugal and Rhodesia was related to the January 1973
closing of the Rhodesia/Zambia border, carried out by Ian Smith’s government with-
out consultation with the ALCORA countries. Not only were the Portuguese
annoyed by this unilateral measure, they actually profited from it, offering - to
Salisbury’s great annoyance - to accommodate extra cargo to and from Zambia on
their railways.68 In June 1973 W. M. Knox, Rhodesia’s ‘accredited diplomatic repre-
sentative in Lisbon’, delivered a personal message from Smith to Caetano precisely
on this point; the Rhodesian Prime Minister noted that ‘criticism of Portugal appar-
ently condoning Zambia’s action’ was growing in his country; many were now
‘saying that our Portuguese friends are losing sympathy for us’. Smith was especially
annoyed because the white countries’ control of Zambia’s rail links would end in two
years’ time, with ‘the completion of the Tanzam Railway’.69
One final episode demonstrates ALCORA’s shortcomings as a credible deterrent.
Over the course of 1973, Portuguese preoccupation with Zairian intentions began to
grow. In March, Marcello Caetano, meeting US Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs David D. Newsome, mentioned the presence of some 40,000 Chinese in
Tanzania, adding that ‘Chinese in large numbers would shortly be coming to Zaire.’70
According to the monthly ALCORA intelligence bulletin for February/March of that
year: ‘Mobutu stated that his meeting in Peking with Mao Tse Tung had been very suc-
cessful and that China and Zaire would now “lead the Afro-Asian world”.’71 Caetano’s
denunciation in a December radio ‘fireside chat’ of the removal of Portuguese immi-
grants from border areas of Zaire led the US Embassy in Lisbon to conclude that it
probably presaged a substantial increase in Zaire-based insurgent activity in Angola.72
Portuguese fears mounted, troop levels were reviewed, and in February 1974 the Com-
mander in Chief of the Portuguese forces in Angola, General Luz Cunha, met the South
African military leadership, headed by Admiral Biermann in Capetown to discuss ‘the
latent threat of invasion on North of Angola and Cabinda by the “Republic of Zaire”
Armed Forces and in support of subversive Organization “FNLA”.’73 The whole pro-
cess was given a codename, ‘Operac¸~ao Stop’; it culminated in the enormous loan
(150 million rands) granted to Lisbon by Pretoria on 8 March. Half of this was spent in
the days that preceded the 25 April revolution, some of it being used to purchase, via
Israel, highly sophisticated weaponry, including the French-designed Crotale surface-
to-air missile system, presumably to shoot down the Mirage fighters which France had
recently sold to Zaire (although the Portuguese were also eager to deter possible aerial
attacks against Guinea).74 This flurry of activity, however, marked as it was by direct
contact among politicians and leading officers, took place outside the confines of
ALCORA.
Revolution in Portugal
On 25 April 1974 the Movimento das Forc¸as Armadas (MFA), made up essentially
of mid-ranking officers with African experience, deposed Marcello Caetano and
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seized power in Portugal. Capitalising on the movement’s lack of an obvious leader,
General Antonio de Spınola, respected by the revolutionary officers for his recent
break with the Caetano regime, moved quickly to be named President of the
Republic - but his conservatism, notably on colonial issues, quickly put him at odds
with the broad mass of the MFA. International observers were caught off-guard by
the coup; this applied especially to those from the ALCORA countries. Indeed, it
was the possibility of an ultra-right wing which preoccupied the South Africans at
the time75; their Ambassador at Lisbon was sceptical about the actions of any left-
wing opposition.76 Most important, in his eyes, had been the publication of Spınola’s
book Portugal e o Futuro. Spınola had, over many years, craftily constructed a public
image of competence and determination. Building on his experiences in Angola and,
more importantly, Guinea, he now announced that the war could not be won by mili-
tary means alone, and advocated a federal solution to the colonial problem. Copies
of his book flew off the shelves. General Costa Gomes, Spınola’s commander, had
sanctioned the publication of the volume; wary of an outright confrontation with the
country’s most senior officers, but asked to remain at his post by President Americo
Tomas, Marcello Caetano was caught in a bind. After some hesitation Caetano
spoke on overseas policy in the National Assembly on 5 March77, and then orches-
trated a ritual show of obedience by the officer corps that not all could stomach.
Spınola and Costa Gomes refused to attend, and were dismissed from their positions.
Spınola’s post, which had been created for him, was extinguished; Costa Gomes’
role, significantly, was taken over by General Luz Cunha, who had been overseeing
‘Operac¸~ao Stop’ in close conjunction with Pretoria. The matter seemed, to Pretoria,
to have been resolved in Caetano’s favour.
If ALCORA’s plan for a military solution to the crisis was unrealistic, then so too
was Spınola’s view of a federal ‘Lusitanian Community’, intended to rest on the prin-
ciple of self-determination of all ‘Portuguese’, be they Europeans, Africans, or
Asians. For a time, non-MFA officers, such as those involved in ALCORA, believed
that Spınola might succeed in twinning a continued commitment to the war with the
search for a political solution. The truth, however, was that no one else viewed this
as viable, especially not the nationalist movements and their international backers,
be it in the frontline states, the Communist bloc, or the West. Their wishes for an
immediate decolonisation were matched by the aspirations of the bulk of the
Portuguese armed forces still in Africa. But it would take the revolution and some
three months’ worth of equivocation in its wake to make the army’s intentions clear.
As a result, ALCORA remained in place and the 7th ATLC meeting went ahead, in
Pretoria, from 24 to 28 June. It was not yet clear how Portuguese policy in Africa
would evolve, since the power struggle between the MFA and President Spınola was
reaching its peak. The Portuguese delegate, General Basto Machado, had been
Kaulza de Arriaga’s successor in Mozambique and was therefore well acquainted
with the situation in that territory. The rest of the Portuguese delegation had a long
history of ALCORA business.78 There was an air of unreality to proceedings, given
the situation in Portugal. Chairing the meeting, South African Chief of Staff General
R. F. Armstrong stated, in his opening address, that the major task of ALCORA -
and the reason behind PAPO’s creation - was the elimination of terrorism in South-
ern Africa. As we have seen, this was a dramatic departure from ALCORA’s early
concerns with conventional warfare. Basto Machado replied that ‘the Portuguese
delegation was prepared to work with the maximum efficiency and co-operation that
the present circumstances allowed.’ This was hardly a vote of confidence, but another
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ALCORA veteran, Rhodesian delegate Air Marshal McLaren, could not contain his
enthusiasm: ‘This ATLC meeting was an historic occasion in that it was the first to
be held in the ALCORA Headquarters - PAPO.’
With the meeting under way, the limitations on the Portuguese quickly became
obvious. Press releases regarding ALCORA were out of the question; it would be dif-
ficult to fill the remaining vacancies in PAPO79; and, given the circumstances in
Angola and Mozambique - but especially given the circumstances in Portugal, where
the government and the parties were at war over the course of colonial policy - it
would be ‘difficult at this stage to plan for the elimination of terrorism’. Moreover,
given the international situation, it was ‘undesirable to consider any joint action by
ALCORA within Mozambique at this time’. Portugal would not renege on the
commitment to prevent her territory from being used as a base for attacks on other
countries, but such a commitment demanded a continuation of military control over
the areas concerned which could not be guaranteed indefinitely. The prospects for
ALCORA were, in other words, bleak at best, but the other delegations seemed deaf
to Lisbon’s predicament. The Rhodesians, for example, re-emphasised the new view
that ‘the main object of ALCORA was the formation of forces to combat terrorism’,
an aim essential to Rhodesia’s survival: in order to guarantee this, ‘it was vital for
military operations to continue into Mozambique.’ But for the Portuguese, even ‘hot
pursuit’ was now becoming problematic; there might come a time when the
Portuguese were no longer in political control, even if they remained in military con-
trol, and in such a situation hot pursuit would not be allowed.
The pressure the Rhodesians were under was evident again in their insistence on
the continuation of studies regarding the MSF and the ATRF , attributed a high pri-
ority in previous tripartite government meetings, but totally dependent on South
African resources for their creation. As their delegates put it: ‘ALCORA must have
a plan.’ The Portuguese were quiet on the issue, the South Africans sceptical: ‘The
three nations should so plan and develop their own forces so that when a situation
develops which requires joint action, each nation will have the tools to do the job.’
This, of course, made a mockery of ALCORA, and the Rhodesians were quick to
point it out that their country ‘was fighting for her survival’. Their appeal, surpris-
ingly, had an effect. The ATLC issued a directive to PAPO which stated, once again,
that ‘ALCORA stands for a tripartite effort between the ALCORA nations to co-
operate in military matters, with the prime aim of eliminating terrorism where it may
exist, in the ALCORA territories.’80 PAPO was thereby charged with preparing a
study ‘to determine how best to defeat terrorism in Southern Africa by joint action’.
It was recognised, nevertheless, that this PAPO study, due on 31 August, depended
on the co-operation of national staffs, who were invited to share their information
fully with PAPO. Routine administrative matters were also pursued by the meeting,
with new documents being approved and others reported on; it was agreed, pending
approval, that the 8th ATLC meeting should be held, of all places, in Lisbon, from
18–22 November. In the event, the meeting occurred earlier than scheduled, on
14–15 October. The political situation in Portugal was nebulous. Spınola, unable to
get his way over Africa (a date for Mozambique’s independence, and interim govern-
ment arrangements, had been negotiated with FRELIMO), and worried by the leftist
drift of the country, had resigned, being replaced as President by the more pragmatic
Costa Gomes. The well-organised Portuguese Communist Party was in the
ascendancy; one of its sympathisers, Colonel Vasco Gonc¸alves, headed the govern-
ment. The ALCORA meeting was chaired by General J. A. Pinheiro, Assistant to
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the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Walls and Armstrong represented, respec-
tively, Rhodesia and South Africa. This time there were no equivocations. From the
onset Pinheiro announced that ‘the future of ALCORA cannot remain in its present
form.’ Pinheiro insisted that all deals regarding hot pursuit of suspects were off as a
result of the Lusaka agreement with FRELIMO.81 It was also the case that the
Portuguese believed FRELIMO and the Angolan nationalist movements suspected
the existence of military deals between Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, which,
it was feared, would derail attempts to carry out a peaceful transition in the soon-to-
be ex-colonies: ‘The Chairman made clear the impossibility for Portugal of allowing
any military activity within the ALCORA concept.’
According to Pinheiro’s account, Portugal had not entirely forgotten the interests
of its ALCORA partners: ‘Portugal tries and will always try to convince FRELIMO
about the interest of their cooperation with the R.S.A. and Rhodesia’; the former
‘terrorists’, now partners in power in Mozambique, had already, it seemed, ‘modified
their initial position towards the two countries’, especially South Africa. The case of
Angola, of course, was different, given the number of liberation movements and
white settlers; to bring about a peaceful solution would require time, a solution for
the other colonies, and economic/financial support. It was this support which the
ALCORA partners could now make available to Portugal, if indeed they desired a
peaceful Angola.
While the South African delegation’s comments were brief and guarded, the
Rhodesians’ were of a different mood. Hot pursuit, they argued, was a necessity; it
was a right enjoyed by every country, and Rhodesia, while establishing contact with
FRELIMO via Portuguese officers, would continue to engage in such military action
against ZANU. They also alleged that FRELIMO, by appearing better disposed
towards South Africa, was engaging in an ‘age old method of separating good
friends’. The Portuguese replied that military co-operation was now out of the ques-
tion. As for ALCORA, it could not ‘continue under that name and aims’. This did
not mean that the countries involved could not be friends, and Portugal could serve
as an interlocutor with FRELIMO; as for the officers based in PAPO, they could
remain in Pretoria, ‘but under a different guise’. The South Africans were under no
illusions: what mattered now was considering what should take ALCORA’s place.
As the minutes show, ‘it was decided that each delegation would consider separately
what form of agreement it was now possible to reach.’ This led eventually to a brief
document, little over a page long, entitled ‘Agreements as to future cooperation’.
This extended to intelligence exchanges ‘related to the maintenance of peace and
security in Southern Africa’ and to ‘technological research and development’, as well
as the promotion of ‘goodwill, understanding and cooperation’ in Southern Africa.
The document also committed Portugal to ‘persuade’ the emerging Mozambican
and Angolan authorities to deny their territory to ‘terrorist organizations’, and to
bring their own support for SWAPO to an end. There should be continued meetings
at ATLC or ‘even higher’ level, but ‘the code name ALCORA is to be dropped and
future cooperation will continue under a new codename’. As for PAPO, it would
‘cease to exist from 31 October 1974’.
Conclusion
ALCORA was not the answer to the enormous difficulties facing the ‘white redoubt’
in southern Africa: far from it, in fact. The three constituent parts were simply too
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far apart in their past history and future outlook to be able to work together, what-
ever a relatively small group of staff officers might have hoped for. This was obvious
from the start: Portugal remained a European country, whose economy, for all the
efforts being made in Africa, was geared towards trade with the European Economic
Community (EEC) and European Free Trade Area (EFTA), to which it belonged.
Its political and economic elites did not want the country to be a pariah, relying
totally on the links with the empire and the ALCORA partners. The lure of Euro-
pean integration was powerful, as was growing frustration with the human and mate-
rial cost of the African wars. Hence the difficulties in making ALCORA better
known, despite the dissuasive effects of going public with the Exercise and compo-
nents such as the permanent reaction force. Meanwhile, South Africa’s political lead-
ership, divided over issues of tactics and personality, did not yet believe in the
possibility of its demise: the ALCORA partners were seen as useful, but ultimately
expendable. For Rhodesia, very much in the front line, ALCORA was a practical
expedient, a way of reaching a desired end: the military defeat of its existential ene-
mies, the Zimbabwean liberation movements. Nothing else mattered.
There were other, more practical difficulties affecting the development of
ALCORA into an entity capable of transforming the situation in the region. Contact
between the ATLC and front-line commanders was infrequent and poor. The PCC
was envisaged as the mechanism which would ensure these commanders a say in the
running of ALCORA, and its importance was recognised by the ISC but not, it
seems, by anybody else. It never operated properly, and was eventually subsumed
into the ATLC, but too much time had been wasted in the process. It was also the
case that the gathering and dissemination of useful intelligence, arguably ALCORA’s
most basic mission, proved to be a difficulty. The ISC was always independent-
minded and difficult to control; PAIO, designed to help it, was very limited in scope
and means. In any case the ISC and PAIO were focused exclusively on threats to
ALCORA from the outside. This was behind its most spectacular failure: the inabil-
ity to see the trouble brewing within the Portuguese Army. Exhaustion with the war;
the inability of the political leadership to arrive at a negotiated solution to the crisis;
mounting international criticism: all combined to turn the Portuguese Army from a
mainstay of ALCORA into the instrument of its demise.
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